More Armstrong, Conceptual Analysis

Thanks for the helpful comment regarding conceptual analysis. I share the skepticism of conceptual analysis, although I must admit I have a lot more work to do in that area- I need to know more about conceptual analysis before I can sustain a legitimate critique. Here are some more thoughts on that tangent:
(1) I agree that conceptual analysis appears to be a degenerating research program, which is part of the reason why I think it might be interesting to think about conceptual analysis in Lakatos' terms. That is, let's put all of our cards on the table: What is it exactly that we are trying to explain (for example, in my post on Place I wondered what the parallel would be for explanation involved in identifying lightning with electric charges), what is the "hard core" that the different approaches are committed to, and how do the different approaches compare with one another in terms of the standards for successful and degenerating research programs.
(2) Assuming we're skeptical of traditional forms of conceptual analysis: Is there still any sense in which understanding/discovering "consciousness is a brain process" is different from understaning/discovering "lightning is electric charges", in the sense that it seems easier to understand the meaning of "lightning" than "consciousness" or any other mental concept?
(3) Again, assuming we're skeptical of traditional forms of conceptual analysis: Perhaps this needn't preclude us from giving some sort of functional account of mental states (as opposed to mental concepts), but maybe we'd need to provide different types of arguments in support of the functionalist account? That is, to what extent are functionalist accounts dependent upon conceptual analysis? And to the extent that a functionalist account is not dependent upon conceputal analysis, how does it compare with Place's identity theory?
(4) Poison vs. Lightning: Is it more instructive to think of mental concepts as analogous to lightning (with the proviso that Place is not including cognition/volition in this analogy), or as analogous to poison? I suppose the poison analogy lends itself more to the conceptual analysis project, but there are problems with the lightning analogy as well: I'm repeating myself here, but if the meaning of "lighting" was on par with the meaning of mental concepts, philosophers would not be so interested in mental concepts. Of course, it could be that the interest has been systematically mistaken (this is the conclusion of eliminative materialism, yes?), but there is still work to be done in explaining away the apparent difference.
(5) Finally, I just want to point out that the conceptual analysis of poison here seems weird, although maybe this is just a reflection of my skepticism of conceptual analysis: Is the game here to try and find necessary and sufficient conditions for poison? If so, a simple causal analysis clearly doesn't accomplish this. Do we just look up poison in the dictionary, as Armstrong seems to have done?

conceptual analysis, here we come

Place's article avoids dealing with an explicit analysis of mental concepts, in part because Place's goal is to demonstrate the logical possibility of the identity theory, and the logical possibility doesn't seem to depend on a particular analysis of the concepts involved. But, in order to provide a substantive identity theory, more work needs to be done: namely, and understanding of the meaning of mental concepts. In other words: Place makes a good case that "consciousness is a brain process" could be on similar footing with "lightning is electric charges." But, it seems much easier to understand the meaning of "lightning" than it is to understand the meaning of "consciousness", or any other mental concept.
I love Armstrong's honesty in admitting that he's not quite sure what's going on in conceptual analysis. This topic is bound to come up again and again during our readings. Unfortunately, and unsurprisingly, Armstrong does not solve the problem of conceptual analysis here. However, I want to point out two interesting things going on in his discussion of conceptual analysis:
(1) The idea of conceptual analysis as a research program (a la Lakatos) seems like a refreshing way to think about the nature of, and possible progress in, philosophical analysis. I'm pretty sure that Lakatos' approach to scientific theories has only been applied to the study of theory development/change in the natural sciences, and not to the social sciences. So it's a pretty big jump to think of conceptual analysis in philosophy along these lines. Still...
(2) Is the conceptual analysis of poison actually similar to the conceptual analysis of mental concepts? I don't know. What would a conceptual analysis of lightning look like? What does Armstrong mean when he says "it is surely not an empirical fact, to be learnt by experience, that poisons kill."
Armstrong and the Problem of the Secondary Qualities: Part of this I think has to do with qualia issues that we'll get to in future readings. His first response looks similar to Place's discussion of the phenomenological fallacy. Then he moves on to the nature of secondary qualities such as color. I'm content to leave this issue alone for the time being.