Meaning and Mental Representation Chapter 2

How an account of mental meaning might fit into an account of meaning:
According to the neo-Gricean theory of meaning, semantic properties of representations are derived from the intentionality of their users- either directly, or indirectly via convention. So, meaning depends on the communicative intentions of communicating agents.
This theory is a species of theory that reduces meaning generally to intentionality. So, it provides an asymmetric treatment of meaning in that it accords priority to mental meaning. [But, it is possible to hold that mental and nonmental representation are basically the same- see Block 1986 "Advertisements for a Semantics for Psychology", and Millikan 1984 Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories. A symmetrical treatment of representation must ground intentionality in mental represenation. Two basic strategies- localism and globalism.]
The problem with using this theory to explain mental representation is that people don't use mental representations with the intention to communicate anything to anyone. One strategy, perhaps, for solving this would be to reduce nonmental meaning to intentionality, and then use RTI to reduce intentionality to mental representation.
Now for the main questions: What is it for a mental representation to have a content, and determines what content it has? In the context of CTC- what makes a data structure a represenation, and what determines what it represents.