Monday, April 30, 2007

PCRG Reading Schedule Update

We'll go in the following direction (of course, suggestions and requests are always welcome):

  1. Armstrong's Materialism (one paper in Mind & Cognition and one photocopied in the office): Introducing the Causal Theory of Mind (Early Functionalism)...
  2. Prinz & Goldman/Pust. (photocopies in office) We detour (only slightly) into methodology: a look at conceptual analysis. What kind of philosophical and scientific work might/should we expect from the modal intuitions generated by the method of cases? Do they provide a privileged sort of data? What should we expect from the philosophy of mind, if anything, over and above what the 'sciences' of the mind might discover?
  3. Comparing and contrasting metaphysical essentialism with psychological essentialism. (photocopies in office). Are there any consequences (for instance) for Kripke's account of identity and necessity if metaphysical essentialism is ill-founded? Kripke relies heavily on the method of cases and semantic intuitions.
  4. Philosophical and Psychological Behaviorism. (Ryle, Skinner, Chomsky, Place, Quine, etc.). The shift from Behaviorism to Cognitivism in psychology is one of the most marked in recent scientific history. In the wake of that shift, Behaviorism has often come to be ridiculed as an embarrisingly untenable position. This is certainly unfair; it took the development of radically new technology and Chomsky, possibly the most celebrated intellectual in recent history to usher in a new paradigm. We should look closer to see what was motivating behaviorists, and where and why it was perceived to go wrong. What's the difference between Philosophical and Psychological Behaviorism? How are they related? I suspect we'll be on this for a while, once we get here.

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